Be a Us Citizen for House of Representatives

Article I, Section two, Clause 2:

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Historic period of 20 five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

A question much disputed but now seemingly settled is whether a condition of eligibility must exist at the time of the election or whether information technology is sufficient that eligibility be when the Member-elect presents himself to take the oath of office. Although the linguistic communication of the clause expressly makes residency in the land a condition at the time of election, it at present appears established in congressional practice that the age and citizenship qualifications need only be met when the Member-elect is to exist sworn.i Thus, persons elected to either the Firm of Representatives or the Senate before attaining the required age or term of citizenship have been admitted as soon as they became qualified.2

Writing in The Federalist with reference to the election of Members of Congress, Hamilton firmly stated that "[t]he qualifications of the persons who may . . . be called . . . are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature." 3 Until the Civil War, the issue was not raised, the only actions taken by either Firm conforming to the idea that the qualifications for membership could not be enlarged by statute or practice.4 Simply in the passions aroused by the fratricidal conflict, Congress enacted a law requiring its members to take an oath that they had never been disloyal to the National Government.5 Several persons were refused seats by both Houses because of charges of disloyalty,6 and thereafter House practise, and Senate practice too, was erratic.7 But in Powell v. McCormack ,8 information technology was conclusively established that the qualifications listed in clause 2 are exclusive9 and that Congress could not add together to them past excluding Members-elect non coming together the additional qualifications.10

Powell was excluded from the 90th Congress on grounds that he had asserted an unwarranted privilege and immunity from the process of a state courtroom, that he had wrongfully diverted Firm funds for his ain uses, and that he had fabricated false reports on the expenditures of foreign currency.eleven The Court determination that he had been wrongfully excluded proceeded in the master from the Court's analysis of historical developments, the Convention debates, and textual considerations. This process led the Court to conclude that Congress's power nether Article I, § v to judge the qualifications of its Members was express to ascertaining the presence or absence of the standing qualifications prescribed in Article I, § two, cl. two, and perhaps in other express provisions of the Constitution.12 The conclusion followed because the English parliamentary practice and the colonial legislative do at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, after some earlier deviations, had settled into a policy that exclusion was a power exercisable only when the Member-elect failed to meet a continuing qualification,13 because in the Constitutional Convention the Framers had defeated provisions allowing Congress past statute either to create property qualifications or to create boosted qualifications without limitation,fourteen and considering both Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist Papers and Hamilton in the New York ratifying convention had strongly urged that the Constitution prescribed exclusive qualifications for Members of Congress.15

Further, the Court observed that the early practice of Congress, with many of the Framers serving, was consistently limited to the view that exclusion could exist exercised only with regard to a Fellow member-elect failing to meet a qualification expressly prescribed in the Constitution. Not until the Civil War did contrary precedents appear, and subsequently practice was mixed.16 Finally, even were the intent of the Framers less clear, said the Court, it would still exist compelled to interpret the ability to exclude narrowly. "A fundamental principle of our representative commonwealth is, in Hamilton'due south words, 'that the people should cull whom they please to govern them.' two Elliot's Debates 257. As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this principle is undermined every bit much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. In credible agreement with this basic philosophy, the Convention adopted his suggestion limiting the power to expel. To permit essentially that same ability to be exercised nether the guise of judging qualifications, would be to ignore Madison'southward alarm, borne out in the Wilkes case and some of Congress's own postal service-Civil War exclusion cases, against 'vesting an improper and dangerous power in the Legislature.' " 17 Thus, the Courtroom appears to say, to allow the House to exclude Powell on this footing of qualifications of its own choosing would impinge on the interests of his constituents in effective participation in the balloter process, an interest which could exist protected by a narrow interpretation of Congressional power.18

The outcome in Powell had been foreshadowed when the Court held that the exclusion of a Fellow member-elect by a state legislature because of objections he had uttered to certain national policies constituted a violation of the Kickoff Amendment and was void.xix In the form of that decision, the Court denied state legislators the power to look behind the willingness of whatsoever legislator to take the oath to support the Constitution of the Us, prescribed by Commodity 6, cl. 3, to test his sincerity in taking information technology.twenty The unanimous Court noted the views of Madison and Hamilton on the exclusivity of the qualifications set up out in the Constitution and alluded to Madison'due south view that the unfettered discretion of the legislative branch to exclude members could be abused in behalf of political, religious or other orthodoxies.21 The Commencement Subpoena property and the belongings with regard to testing the sincerity with which the oath of office is taken is no doubtfulness as applicable to the Us Congress as to land legislatures.

However much Congress may have deviated from the principle that the qualifications listed in the Constitution are exclusive when the outcome has been congressional enlargement of those qualifications, information technology has been uniform in rejecting efforts by united states to enlarge the qualifications. Thus, the House in 1807 seated a Member-elect who was challenged as non being in compliance with a country law imposing a twelve-month residency requirement in the district, rather than the federal requirement of being an inhabitant of the country at the time of election; the state requirement, the House resolved, was unconstitutional.22 Similarly, both the Firm and Senate accept seated other Members-elect who did non meet additional land qualifications or who suffered particular country disqualifications on eligibility, such every bit running for Congress while holding particular state offices.

The Supreme Court reached the aforementioned conclusion as to state power, albeit by a surprisingly close five-4 vote, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton .23 Arkansas, along with twenty-2 other states, all simply ii past citizen initiatives, had express the number of terms that Members of Congress may serve. In hit down the Arkansas term limits, the Courtroom determined that the Constitution'south qualifications clauses24 establish sectional qualifications for Members that may non be added to either by Congress or the states.25 Six years later, the Court relied on Thornton to invalidate a Missouri law requiring that labels be placed on ballots alongside the names of congressional candidates who had "disregarded voters' instruction on term limits" or declined to pledge support for term limits.26

Both majority and dissenting opinions in Thornton were richly embellished with disputatious arguments nigh the text of the Constitution, the history of its drafting and ratification, and the practices of Congress and united states of america in the nation's early years,27 and these differences over text, cosmos, and practise derived from disagreement about the fundamental principle underlying the Constitution's adoption.

In the dissent'due south view, the Constitution was the outcome of the resolution of the peoples of the separate states to create the National Government. The conclusion to be drawn from this was that the peoples in usa agreed to surrender just those powers expressly forbidden them and those express powers that they had delegated to the Federal Government expressly or by necessary implication. They retained all other powers and still retain them. Thus, "[w]here the Constitution is silent virtually the practise of a particular power—that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication—the Federal Government lacks that ability and the States savour it." 28 The Constitution'due south silence as to authority to impose additional qualifications meant that this power resides in united states of america.

The majority'south views were radically different. After the adoption of the Constitution, u.s. had two kinds of powers: reserved powers that they had earlier the founding and that were not surrendered to the Federal Government, and those powers delegated to them by the Constitution. It followed that u.s.a. could take no reserved powers with respect to the Federal Government. "Equally Justice Story recognized, 'the states can practice no powers whatsoever, which exclusively bound out of the existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to them. . . . No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.'" 29 The states could not before the founding have possessed powers to legislate respecting the Federal Government, and, because the Constitution did not consul to the states the ability to prescribe qualifications for Members of Congress, u.s. did not accept whatever such power.30

Obviously, the opinions in this case reflect more than a decision on this particular dispute. They rather represent conflicting philosophies within the Courtroom respecting the scope of national power in relation to u.s.a., an issue at the cadre of many controversies today.

Footnotes

1

See S. Rep. No. 904, 74th Congress, 1st sess. (1935), reprinted in 79 Cong. Rec. 9651–9653 (1935).

2

1 Hinds' Precedents of the Firm of Representatives § 418 (1907); 79 Cong. Rec. 9841–42 (1935); cf. 1 Hinds, supra annotation 2, at § 429.

3

No. sixty (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 409. Come across too two J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 623–27 (1833) (relating to the ability of the States to add qualifications).

iv

All the instances appear to exist, still, cases in which the contest arose out of a claimed additional state qualification.

5

Act of July two, 1862, 12 Stat. 502. Note also the disqualification written into § iii of the Fourteenth Amendment.

half dozen

ane Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 451, 449, 457 (1907).

7

In 1870, the House excluded a Member-elect who had been re-elected after resigning before in the same Congress when expulsion proceedings were instituted against him for selling appointments to the War machine Academy. Id. at § 464. A Member-elect was excluded in 1899 considering of his practice of polygamy, id. at 474–fourscore, but the Senate refused, after adopting a rule requiring a two-thirds vote, to exclude a Fellow member-elect on those grounds. Id. at §§ 481–483. The House twice excluded a socialist Member-elect in the wake of Globe War I on allegations of disloyalty. 6 Cannon's Precedents of the Business firm of Representatives §§ 56–58 (1935). Run across also S. Rep. No. 1010, 77th Congress, 2d sess. (1942), and R. Hupman, Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases From 1789 to 1960, S. Doc. No. 71, 87th Congress, 2d sess. (1962), 140 (dealing with the effort to exclude Senator Langer of North Dakota).

8

395 U.Due south. 486 (1969). The Courtroom divided viii to i, Justice Stewart dissenting on the ground that the case was moot. Powell's continuing validity was affirmed in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), both by the Court in its holding that the qualifications set up out in the Constitution are exclusive and may not be added to past either Congress or u.s.a., id. at 787–98, and by the dissenters, who would hold that Congress, for different reasons could not add together to qualifications, although u.s. could. Id. at 875–76.

9

The Courtroom declined to reach the question whether the Constitution in fact does impose other qualifications. 395 U.S. at 520 northward.41 (perhaps Commodity I, § three, cl. 7, disqualifying persons impeached, Commodity I, § 6, cl. 2, incompatible offices, and § 3 of the Fourteenth Subpoena). Information technology is likewise possible that the adjuration provision of Article VI, cl. 3, could be considered a qualification. Come across Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 129–131 (1966).

10

395 U.S. at 550 .

11

H. Rep. No. 27, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967); 395 U.S. at 489–493 .

12

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518–47 (1969).

xiii

395 U.S. at 522–31 .

fourteen

395 U.Southward. at 532–39 .

xv

395 U.S. at 539–41 .

16

395 U.S. at 541–47 .

17

2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 249 (Max Farrand ed., 1937); 395 U.S. at 547–48 .

18

The protection of the voters' interest in being represented past the person of their choice is thus analogized to their constitutionally secured right to cast a ballot and take it counted in general elections, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.Due south. 651 (1884), and in primary elections, United States v. Archetype, 313 U.South. 299 (1941), to cast a ballot undiluted in forcefulness because of unequally populated districts, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.Due south. i (1964), and to cast a vote for candidates of their choice unfettered by onerous restrictions on candidate qualification for the ballot. Williams 5. Rhodes, 393 U.Southward. 23 (1968).

19

Bail five. Floyd, 385 U.Southward. 116 (1966).

xx

385 U.Southward. at 129–31, 132, 135 .

21

385 U.S. at 135 n.xiii .

22

i Hinds' Precedents of the Firm of Representatives § 414 (1907).

23

514 U.S. 779 (1995). The bulk was equanimous of Justice Stevens (writing the opinion of the Court) and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Dissenting were Justice Thomas (writing the stance) and Principal Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 845.

24

Article I, § 2, cl. 2, provides that a person may qualify as a Representative if she is at to the lowest degree 25 years erstwhile, has been a United States denizen for at least seven years, and is an inhabitant, at the fourth dimension of the ballot, of the country in which she is chosen. The qualifications established for Senators, Article I, § iii, cl. 3, are an age of 30 years, nine years' citizenship, and existence an inhabitant of the state at the time of election.

25

The four-Justice dissent argued that while Congress has no power to increment qualifications, us practise. 514 U.Due south. at 845 .

26

Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).

27

See Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 78 (1995).

28

514 U.Due south. at 848 (Justice Thomas dissenting). Come across by and large id. at 846–65.

29

514 U.Southward. at 802 .

xxx

514 U.Southward. at 798–805 . See also id. at 838–45 (Justice Kennedy concurring). The Court applied similar reasoning in Melt v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2001), invalidating ballot labels identifying congressional candidates who had non pledged to support term limits. Considering congressional offices arise from the Constitution, the Court explained, no authority to regulate these offices could accept preceded the Constitution and been reserved to u.s., and the election labels were not valid practice of the power granted by Article I, § 4 to regulate the "manner" of property elections. See discussion under Legislation Protecting Electoral Process, infra.

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Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-2/clause-2/qualifications-of-members-of-the-house-of-representatives

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